Limiting the Employment-at-Will Rule: Enforcing
Policy Manual Promises Through Unilateral
Contract Analysis
I.

INTRODUCTION

The average employee is largely unprotected from arbitrary
termination by his employer.' Although unions can provide job
security, they protect less than sixteen per cent of the working
population.2 For most employees, however, there is a general
presumption that employment contracts are terminable at the
will of either party.3 Despite this presumption, courts have applied contract principles and general policy considerations to determine whether an employment-at-will relationship existed in
wrongful termination cases.4 Recently, in Woolley v. Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc. ,' the New Jersey Supreme Court used this type of analysis to examine the employment-at-will relationship.
In October 1969, Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. hired Richard
Woolley to be a section head in its central engineering depart1 See English v. College of Medicine & Dentistry, 73 N.J. 20, 23, 372 A.2d 295,
297 (1977) (stating common law position that employer has "unbridled authority to
discharge").
2 See Adams, Changing Employment Patterns of Organized Workers, 108 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 25, 29 (1985). Only 15.6% of private-sector workers were unionized,
according to the most updated survey. See id.
3 See generally Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). The Supreme Court
explained the employment-at-will presumption as follows:
[I]t is not within the functions of government-at least in the absence of
contract between the parties-to compel any person in the course of his
business and against his will to accept or retain the personal services of
another, or to compel any person, against his will, to perform personal
services for another. The right of a person to sell his labor upon such
terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the
purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept
such labor from the person offering to sell it. So the right of the employ6 to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the
same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with
the services of such employ6.
Id. at 174-75.
4 See, e.g., Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d
170 (1984); Allegri v. Providence-St. Margaret Health Center, 9 Kan. App. 2d 659,
684 P.2d 1031 (1984); Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371
(Minn. App. 1984); Shiddell v. Electro Rust-Proofing Corp., 34 N.J. Super. 278,
112 A.2d 290 (App. Div. 1954); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443
N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash.
2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977).
5 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
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ment. 6 No written employment contract existed between the parties.7 In addition, the employees of Hoffmann-La Roche were
neither unionized nor under a collective bargaining agreement.'
Soon after Woolley commenced work in mid-November,
Hoffmann-La Roche furnished him with its personnel policy
manual; the manual had Woolley's name and the date printed on
the cover. 9 One section of the manual listed five categories of
employee termination.'" This section was followed by a detailed
description of the termination procedures followed by Hoffmann-La Roche before an employee could be fired for cause."
6

Id. at 286, 491 A.2d at 1258.

7 Id. Hoffmann-La Roche admitted that it was unusual for employees, except

the medical staff, to have individual contracts. Id. at 299, 491 A.2d at 1265.
8 See id. at 296-97 & n.6, 491 A.2d at 1264 & n.6.
9 Id. at 286, 287 n.2, 491 A.2d at 1258, 1259 n.2.
10 See id. at 310-11 app., 491 A.2d at 1271-72 app. The five categories of termination were defined as follows:
- Layoff means termination of employment on the initiative of the company under circumstances, normally lack of work, such that the employee is subject to recall. He/she may be reinstated without loss of
seniority if recalled within one year of the date of layoff.
- Discharge due to Performance means termination of employment on the
initiative of the company under circumstances generally related to the
quality of the employee's performance, whereby the employee is considered unable to meet the requirements of the job. In this case, the employee is not subject to recall or reinstatement.
- Discharge, Disciplinary means termination of employment on the initiative of the company for reasons of misconduct or willful negligence in
the performance ofjob duties such that the employee will not be considered for re-employment.
- Retirement means termination of active work by the employee at the
age or under conditions set forth in the company's retirement plan,
under which the employee receives retirement pay and enjoys other
benefits.
- Resignation means termination of employment on the initiative of the
employee. Employees are expected to give no less than two weeks notice of resignation. An employee who resigns will retain no reinstatement or re-employment rights. Resignation requested is a category of
information on the Personnel Action Form and means termination of
employment, for cause, on the initiative of the company. "Mutual
Agreement" terminations must be further identified as either discharge
due to performance or disciplinary for purposes of severance pay eligibility. . . . For any purposes, terminations are effective on the last day
worked, unless otherwise specified by the Department Head.
Id.
11 See id. at 311-13 app., 491 A.2d at 1272-73 app. The termination procedures
provided as follows:
IV. GUIDELINES FOR DISCHARGE DUE TO PERFORMANCE
In keeping with the company's concern for all employees, termination of
employment on the initiative of the company under circumstances generally related to the quality of the employee's job performance deserves
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No category was set forth in the manual for discharge without
special consideration. We would like to insure that every reasonable
step has been taken to help the employee continue in a productive capacity. It is the responsibility of each manager and supervisor to develop the people working for him/her. In cases of unsatisfactory job
performance, which may develop into termination of employment, each
manager and supervisor should consider the following:
A. Has the employee been made aware of the problem in specific
terms?
B. Are the suggestions as to how these problems can be eliminated
in writing?
C. Has assistance been offered to the employee to help the employee remedy the situation?
D. Has the employee been given a sufficient amount of time and
help to remedy the situation?
If a situation related to poor job performance has just come to a manager's or supervisor's attention, joint evaluation between the employee
and the manager is recommended. The manager should try to determine the cause of the problem. Is it lack of experience in the job, education, motivation, employee personal problems, or personality conflict?
Once the cause is identified, the employee should be given time, if possible, to remedy the situation. The manager should also be considering
ways to remedy the situation and to improve the individual's performance. This may mean the use of outside sources to develop the employee and/or the job to put the employee on an appropriate career
path. Other alternatives are:
A. Changing the employee's responsibilities in his/her present job.
B. Reassignment to a different job in the department.
C. Encouraging the employee to bid into an area where his/her
chances of success are felt to be better.
D. A change to a position of lesser responsibility.
If, after sufficient time and consideration of the above, the employee
does not remedy the situation, the supervisor should then proceed with
the termination of the employee ...
V. GUIDELINES FOR DISCIPLINARY TERMINATIONS
The termination of any employee for disciplinary causes must follow the
procedures as set forth in Section 9.1 through 9.4 of the Personnel Policy Manual.
VI. TERMINATION PROCEDURE
It is the responsibility of the manager to:
Notify the Payroll Department and the Personnel Department of
the cause and date of termination;
Notify the employee of the cause and date of termination;
Prepare a Personnel Action Form stating the reason for termination
and forward this to the Personnel Department.
It is the responsibility of the Personnel Department to:
Provide the terminating employee with Termination Procedure
Forms;
Contact the terminating employee and set up an appointment for
an interview (preferably the last day of work);
Review Termination Procedure Forms for completeness and required clearance signatures;
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cause. 12

Woolley was promoted in 1976 and again in January 1977,
becoming the group leader for the civil engineering, the piping
design, the plant layout, and the standards and systems sections.' 3 In March 1978, Woolley was asked to prepare a report
regarding piping problems in a company building in Nutley, New
Jersey. 14 The report was completed and filed with Woolley's immediate superior on April 5, 1978.1' On May 3, 1978, Woolley's
supervisors requested his resignation. 16 He was informed that
the general manager of the corporation's engineering department had "lost confidence" in his work. l : Woolley refused to resign. 18 After his resignation was again requested and Woolley
again refused to resign, the company fired him in July of 1978.'9
Woolley then initiated a suit against Hoffmann-La Roche, alleging breach of contract.2 ° Woolley claimed that the express and
-

It
-

It
-

Notify the Dispensary, Payroll Department and Credit Union of the
termination;
Provide appropriate Unemployment Compensation information
and forms to the terminating employee;
Conduct appropriate follow-up correspondence with the company
that the terminated employee has accepted employment, stating the
continuing nature of the patent secrecy agreement. Copies of the
letter should go to the employee and the Personnel file;
Forward all termination procedure forms to the Personnel Department Record Room.
is the responsibility of the Payroll Department to:
Verify that the terminating employee has no outstanding financial
liabilities to the company;
Issue and mail a final pay check upon completion of all termination
procedures and receipt of a copy of the Personnel Action Form.
is the responsibility of the HLR Federal Credit Union to:
Check the status of the terminating employee with respect to:
- balances due the employee;
- outstanding Credit Union loans;
and to make arrangements for an interview with the employee for
purposes of proper disposition of any amounts due either the employee or the Credit Union.

Id.
12

Id. at 287 n.2, 491 A.2d at 1259 n.2.

13 Id. at 286, 491 A.2d at 1258.
14

Id.

15 Id.
16
17

Id.
Id.

18 Id.

19 Id.

Id. In his complaint, Woolley further alleged "intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation." Id. Woolley later agreed to dismiss these claims.
20
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implied promises contained in Hoffmann-La Roche's employment policy manual constituted a binding and enforceable contract.2" Woolley argued that pursuant to this contract, he could
only be fired for cause and only after adherence to the dismissal
procedures set forth in the policy manual. 2 2 Consequently, Woolley alleged that because he was fired without cause and the termination procedures were disregarded, his dismissal constituted a
23
breach of contract.
The trial court, holding that Hoffmann-La Roche was not
contractually bound by its manual, granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.2 4 The appellate division agreed that
Woolley's employment was terminable at will and thus affirmed
the judgment. 25 Upon Woolley's appeal, the NewJersey Supreme
Court granted certification. 26 The supreme court held that the
express and implied promises contained in a policy manual distributed to employees could modify the employment-at-will
relationship between the employer and the employee. 27 Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to
the trial court.2 8
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL RULE

The concept of employment at will was first developed in
1877 by an American legal theorist, H.G. Wood.2 9 In his treatise
21 Id. at 286-87, 491 A.2d at 1258.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 287, 491 A.2d at 1258.
24 Id.

25 Id., 491 A.2d at 1259.
26 Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 91 N.J. 548, 453 A.2d 865 (1982).
27 See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 285-86, 307-08, 491 A.2d at 1258, 1269-70.
28 Id. at 307, 491 A.2d at 1269. The supreme court held that on remand, Woolley was to be given the full benefit of the manual he received from Hoffmann-La
Roche. Id. Unfortunately, Richard Woolley died prior to the supreme court's decision. Id. at 287 n.3, 491 A.2d at 1259 n.3. His claim for damages survived, however, and the issue was left to be determined by the trial court. Id. at 287 n.3, 308,
491 A.2d at 1259 n.3, 1270. Furthermore, the supreme court ruled that the trial
court need only decide the issue of whether the provisions contained in the policy
manual were binding. See id. at 307, 491 A.2d at 1270. According to the court, the
issue of whether Woolley was fired for good cause was irrelevant because the employer failed to follow the procedures outlined in the manual. Id. at 307-08, 491
A.2d at 1270. In a subsequent order, however, the court stated that the "good
cause" issue was still open because the court had mistakenly believed "that Hoffmann-La Roche had conceded that it had failed to conform to the contractual termination provisions." Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 101 NJ. 10, 10-11,
499 A.2d 515, 515, modifying 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985).
29 See H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (1877).

470

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16:465

on master-and-servant relationships, Wood departed from the
established common law presumption of one-year employment
contracts;3 0 he argued that there should be no durational presumption.3 1 Early judicial interpretation of "Wood's Rule" resulted in the traditional employment-at-will doctrine: the
employer or employee may terminate the relation "for good
cause, for no cause or even for cause
morally wrong, without be3 2
ing thereby guilty of legal wrong.

Although "Wood's Rule" lacked legal support,3 3 it was consistent with the idea of unrestrained freedom to contract and with
the general laissez faire attitude of the industrial revolution.3 4 It
permitted the growing United States economy a desirable flexibility in employment relations. 35 The employment-at-will rule
was considered equitable, based on the premise that the employer and the employee held equal bargaining positions.3 6 The
employee could protect himself from dismal working conditions
by accepting more favorable employment, while the employer
could maintain his work force by retaining the most productive
employees.3 7 The employment-at-will rule was subsequently
30 See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *425. Blackstone stated: "If the hiring
be general without any particular time limited, the law construes it to be a hiring for
a year; upon a principle of natural equity. . . but the contract may be made for any
larger or smaller term." Id. (footnote omitted).
31 See H. G. WooD, supra note 29, § 134, at 272. Wood stated:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much
a day, week, month or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at
the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve. It is competent for
either party to show what the mutual understanding of the parties was in
reference to the matter; but unless their understanding was mutual that
the service was to extend for a certain fixed and definite period, it is an
indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
32 Payne v. Western & Ad. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
33 See DeGiuseppe, The Effect of the Employment-at- Will Rule on Employment Rights to
Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORD. URB. L.J. 1, 6 (1981); Summers, Individual
Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 485 (1976);
Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1974).
34 See Marrinan, Employment at-Will: Pandora's Box May Have an Attractive Cover, 7
HAMLINE L. REV. 155, 158 (1984); see also Feinman, The Development of the Employment
at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 131-35 (1976) (stating employment-at-will
rule is consistent with development of capitalism).
35 See Decker, At-Will Employment: Abolition and Federal Statutory Regulation, 61 U.
DET. J. URB. L. 351, 353 (1984).
36 See id.; Marrinan, supra note 34, at 158.
37 See Decker, supra note 35, at 353.
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supported by the courts and attained fruition in the early part of
this century.3 8
The employment-at-will rule, however, can have a harsh and
inequitable impact on employees. 39 Thus, authorities have
moved toward abrogating the rule by protecting against "wrongful" discharges.4 ° For example, the United States Congress
passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 4 which protects workers
against discharge on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 42 The NewJersey Legislature has enacted a similar statute.4 3 Judicial decisions have also had a significant impact
in modifying the rule.44 Specifically, three theories have been
successfully argued by wrongfully discharged employees: the
public policy exception, the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, and the employment contract limitation.45
A.

The Public Policy Exception

The public policy exception arises when an employee is discharged for refusing to violate a law or act against the public inSee Summers, supra note 33, at 485.
See generally Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967) (discussion of the
potential inequity of employment-at-will relationship).
40 See Decker, supra note 35; DeGiuseppe, supra note 33; Rohwer, Terminable-atWill Employment: New Theoriesfor Job Security, 15 PAC. L.J. 759 (1984) (all discussing
erosion of the employment-at-will rule).
41 Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. H9 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)).
42 Id. § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. at 255 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982)).
The following statutes are other examples of Federal legislation limiting the employment-at-will rule: Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)
(1982); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982). See generally Decker,
supra note 35, at 353-55 (discussing Federal regulations affecting the employmentat-will relationship).
43 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1976). In 1980, a bill was proposed in the
New Jersey Assembly limiting the right to terminate nonunion employees "after the
first consecutive 6 months of an individual'semployment" only for good cause. See A. 1832,
199th NJ. Leg., 1st Sess. 1 (1980).
44 Decker, supra note 35, at 355 & n.39.
45 See Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A QuadrennialAssessment of
the Labor Law Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAw. 1, 6 (1984). See generally id. at 6-26 (discussing public policy, good faith and fair dealing, and contract exceptions to employment-at-will theory).
This comment will analyze the three most popular theories. Other theories
include intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, prima facie tort,
negligence, and interference with employment contracts. See, e.g., DeGiuseppe,
supra note 33, at 40; Marrinan, supra note 34, at 172.
38

39
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terest at his employer's demand.46 New Jersey recognized the
public policy exception in Pierce v. Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp.47 Dr.
Grace Pierce was employed by the Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.
(Ortho) as the associate director of medical research.48 Ortho
was a developer and manufacturer of reproductive and therapeutic drugs.49 In 1975, Dr. Pierce worked on developing a drug
called loperamide, which could be used as a treatment for diarrhea.5 0 Because the formula contained saccharin, a compound of
questionable safety, Pierce and her fellow developers agreed that
the drug would be unsuitable for consumption in the United
States. 51 The defendant insisted, however, that the development

of loperamide continue. 52 Dr. Pierce believed that continued development of a drug that might be harmful to humans would violate her Hippocratic oath and ethical standards.53 Accordingly,
she refused to continue her work on loperamide.54 Within a
46 See Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge.- The Public Policy
Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1936-37 (1983). The public policy exception has
been used in the following circumstances: (1) when an employee was fired for failure to give false testimony at a trial or hearing, e.g., Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Ivy v. Army Times
Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981); (2) when an employee was fired for filing
a workers' compensation claim, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384
N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d
425 (1973); Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981) (per curiam);
(3) when an employee was fired for refusing to become involved in illegal pricefixing, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); (4) when an employee was fired for refusing to engage in
false labeling, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d
385 (1980); and (5) when an employee was fired for "whistleblowing" on illegal
conduct, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d
876 (1981); Watassek v. Department of Mental Health, 143 Mich. App. 556, 372
N.W.2d 617 (1985); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978); see
also Malin, Protecting the Whistleblowerfrom Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 277 (1983) (discussing "whistleblower's" utility to society).
47 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). See generally Beyond Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.: The Terminable-at-WillDoctrine in New Jersey, 37 RurTGERS L. REV. 137,
141-49 (1984) (examining public policy exception to employment at will in New
Jersey).
48 Pierce, 84 N.J. at 62, 417 A.2d at 506.
49 Id.
50 Id., 417 A.2d at 506-07.
51 Id., 417 A.2d at 507. Loperamide, however, had already been marketed in
Europe. Id.
52 See id.
53 See id. at 63, 417 A.2d at 507.
54 See id. Upon being removed from the loperamide project, Dr. Pierce met with
her supervisor regarding a new assignment. Id. After the meeting, she believed that
"she was being demoted, even though her salary level would not be decreased." Id.

1986]

COMMENT

473

month, Dr. Pierce resigned.55 She then initiated a wrongful discharge action 5against
Ortho, complaining that she was forced to
6
leave her job.

Endorsing the public policy exception, the court opined that
an employee had a cause of action for a discharge that violated
public policy.5 7 According to the court, public policy was formulated by the legislature, administrative agencies, and the judiciary. 58 The court posited that a professional code of ethics could
also be a source of public policy, but "that the Hippocratic oath
[did] not contain a clear mandate of public policy that prevented
Dr. Pierce from continuing her research on loperamide. ' ' 59 Ac-

cordingly, the court found that Dr. Pierce was not wrongfully discharged.60 The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would

seriously hinder the development of new drugs by drug
manufacturers. 6 '
B.

The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Another doctrine, the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, creates an obligation on the employer to use good
faith in terminating an employee. 62 The few jurisdictions adopting this exception to the employment-at-will rule found that an
obligation of good faith and fair dealing is implied in each employment contract. 63 This concept was first applied in Monge v.
See id.at 63-64, 417 A.2d at 507.
See id. at 64, 417 A.2d at 508.
57 Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
58 See id.
59 Id. at 76, 417 A.2d at 514.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See generally Lopatka, supra note 45, at 23-26 (examination of covenant of good
faith and fair dealing); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge:
The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1836-44 (1980)
(same).
63 Decker, supra note 35, at 358; e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App.
3d 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 727-28 (1980); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 193
Conn. 558, 568-69, 479 A.2d 781, 786-87 (1984); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 103, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (1977); Gates v. Life of Mont.
Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 184, 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1982); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974). Contra Gordon v. Matthew
Bender & Co., 562 F. Supp. 1286 (N.D. Il. 1983); Neighbors v. Kirksville College
of Osteopathic Medicine, 694 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. App. 1985); Murphy v. American
Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); Holloway v. K-Mart Corp., 113 Wis. 2d 143, 334 N.W.2d 570 (Ct. App. 1983). See
generally 1 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 670, at 159 (3d
ed. 1957) (at common law "there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing" in every contract).
55
56
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Beebe Rubber Co. 64
In Monge, the employee refused to accept a date with her
foreman and was subsequently harassed, demoted, and fired.6 5
The employee sought damages, claiming a breach of her employment contract.6 6 The New Hampshire Supreme Court held in
favor of the employee, reasoning that a discharge "motivated by
bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a
breach of the employment contract."67
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has also
been used where an employee was terminated without cause following a long record of service.68 In Fortunev. National Cash Register Co. 69 a salesman under an employment-at-will contract had
been terminated after twenty-five years of employment with the
National Cash Register Company (National). 70 The evidence indicated that National had terminated the employee in order to
avoid paying him a "bonus credit."' 7 The Massachusetts
Supreme Court ruled for the plaintiff, holding that the "implied
in the employment concovenant of good faith and fair dealing"
72
defendant.
the
by
breached
was
tract
C.

Employment Contract Limitations

The basic employment-at-will contract can be supplemented
by additional terms that can restrict the employer's power to terminate the employee. 7 3 Courts have adopted these terms as con114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
See id. at 131-32, 316 A.2d at 550-51. The evidence showed that the company's personnel manager was aware that the foreman "used his position to force
his attentions on the female employees under his authority." Id. at 132, 316 A.2d at
551.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551 (citations omitted).
68 E.g., McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980);
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
69 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
70 See id. at 97, 100, 364 N.E.2d at 1253, 1254.
71 Id. at 105, 364 N.E.2d at 1258.
72 See id. at 104-05, 364 N.E.2d at 1257. The court stated: "We hold that [National's] written contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a termination not made in good faith constitutes a breach of contract." Id.
at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1255-56.
73 See, e.g., Thompson v. American Motor Inns, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 409, 416
(W.D. Va. 1985); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 228, 685
P.2d 1081, 1087 (1984) (en banc); Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d
702, 707 (Wyo. 1985).
64

65
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tractual modifications to the employment-at-will rule. 4 Sources
of modifying terms have included hiring letters, 7 5 oral assurances, 7 6 and written policy manuals.7 7
In Hillman v. Hodag Chemical Corp. ,78 the plaintiff and the corporation held discussions concerning ajob opportunity. 79 Subsequently, the corporation sent the plaintiff a letter stating that it
would employ the plaintiff "to perform such functions as assigned for two years minimum and at $15,400 per year." 8 0 After
8
working for a few months, the plaintiff was fired without cause. '
The Illinois Court of Appeals found that the language in the hiring letter modified the employment-at-will relationship between
the parties and created an employment term of two years.8 2
In Martin v. FederalLife InsuranceCo. ,83 an employer had given
oral assurances of permanent employment during pre-employment negotiations.8 4 The plaintiff decided to accept the employer's offer and reject another job offer.8 5 Subsequently, the
plaintiff's employment was terminated by the company, and he
instituted an action for wrongful discharge.8 6 The court held that
87
the oral representations could be contractually enforceable.
74 See supra note 73.
75 See, e.g.,
Integon Life Ins. Corp. v. Vandegrift, 11 Ark. App. 270, 669 S.W.2d

492 (1984).
76 See, e.g.,
Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479, 481 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(evidence of oral assurances creates issue of material fact); Eales v. Tanana Valley
Medical-Surgical Group, Inc., 663 P.2d 958, 959 (Alaska 1983) (same).
77 See infra note 98.
78 96 Ill. App. 2d 204, 238 N.E.2d 145 (1968).
79 See id. at 206-07, 238 N.E.2d at 147.
80 Id.
81 See id. at 206, 238 N.E.2d at 146.
82 Id. at 208-09, 238 N.E.2d at 148. Because both parties signed the hiring letters, the court held that the letters imposed obligations on both the employer and
the employee. See id. at 209, 238 N.E.2d at 148.
83 109 Ill.
App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998 (1982).
84 Id. at 598, 440 N.E.2d at 1001. The employer orally promised that "he would
retain plaintiff until he retired from all business pursuits or no longer wished to be
employed at Federal, so long as he continued to perform satisfactorily." Id.
85 Id. Plaintiff refused a job offer from a competitor of Federal Life Insurance
Company. Id.
86 See id.
87 Id. at 603-04, 440 N.E.2d at 1004. The court stated: "[W]e believe that when
the employee gives up another offer in exchange for and in reliance upon the employer's promise of permanent employment, that contract, if proved, is enforceable." Id. at 602-03, 440 N.E.2d at 1004. Contra Bird v.J.L. Prescott Co., 89 NJ.L.
591, 99 A. 380 (1916).
In Bird, the employee was injured while on the job. Id.at 591, 99 A. at 381. In
exchange for his forbearance from suit against the company, the employer offered
him a "life job." Id. at 591-92, 99 A. at 381. In addition to the oral assurance, the

476

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16:465

Although courts have found other communications sufficient
to be contractually enforceable, employment policy manuals appear to be the most significant means to modify the employmentat-will relationship. 88 A number of jurisdictions, however, have
held that policy manuals do not evidence an intent to contract,
but are simply communications of the company's "philosophy,"
having a nonbinding effect. 89 For example, in Johnson v. National
Beef Packing Co. ,9o an employee was hired by the National Beef
Packing Company and given a "Company Policy Manual"; the
manual guaranteed that "[n]o employee shall be dismissed without just cause."'" In denying the employee's wrongful termination claim, the court reasoned that the manual failed to create a
contract because "[ilt was only a unilateral expression of company policy and procedures. Its terms were not bargained for by
the parties and any benefits conferred by it were mere gratuities.
Certainly, no meeting of the minds was evidenced by
the defend92
ant's unilateral act of publishing company policy."
In 1980, the Michigan Supreme Court, in the landmark decision of Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,93 recognized that a
company policy manual could modify the employer's right to atcompany gave the plaintiff a written document guaranteeing permanent employment. Id. at 592, 99 A. at 381. In refusing to enforce the employment contract, the
court noted that nothing was mentioned pertaining to wages. Id. The court held
that both communications "amount to no more than a friendly assurance of employment and are not sufficiently definite to make an enforceable contract." Id.
88 See Lopatka, supra note 45, at 17 & n.92. The author stated:
Although the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
may be the most widely recognized at the moment, for several reasons
the implied-in-fact contract term exception is potentially more pervasive
and perilous. Until recently, courts have not regarded a nonunion employer's unilateral representations or policy statements regarding job
security, evaluations, disciplinary procedures, and the like as binding
contractual commitments.
Id. at 17 (footnotes omitted). The enforcement of policy manuals is significant because these manuals often give nonunion employees the only communication as to

the terms of their employment.. See 14 EMPLOYMENT

COORDINATOR (RESEARCH INST.

or AM.)
PM-l 1,051 (1985). One looseleaf service states: "Employee handbooks
serve as official notification to the employees of company policy and benefits....
[T]hey are important to the company from an employee relations standpoint." Id.
89 See, e.g., Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779
(1976); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982); see
also W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
93 (1985) (stating courts reject personnel policies as part of employment contract
where policies are only general expressions of good will).
90 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976).
91 Id. at 54, 551 P.2d at 781.
92 Id. at 55, 551 P.2d at 782.
93 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
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will termination of employees.9 4 Charles Toussaint was hired by
Blue Cross and was given a company policy manual that contained disciplinary procedures and assurances of employee termination "for just cause only." 9 5 Toussaint was terminated after
five years of employment, and he subsequently commenced an
action for wrongful discharge.9 6 The court found that the assurances in the manual could become part of the employment contract if they created legitimate expectations on the part of the
employee. 9 7 The Toussaint decision has been followed by the majority ofjurisdictions. 98 New Jersey recently joined these jurisdictions by recognizing the enforceability of promises in policy
manuals through its ruling in Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. 9

III.

THE WOOLLEY COURT'S ANALYSIS

In Woolley, the NewJersey Supreme Court applied traditional
contract principles to determine whether a policy manual could
be the basis of an enforceable contract between the employee
624-25, 292 N.W.2d at 897.
Id. at 597-98, 292 N.W.2d at 884. In addition, Toussaint was orally assured
that he would have continued employment "as long as [he] did [his] job." Id. at
94 See id. at
95

597, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
96 Id. at 595, 292 N.W.2d at 883.
97 Id. at 598-99, 292 N.W.2d at 885.

98 See Barger v. General Elec. Co., 599 F. Supp. 1154, 1164 n.8 (W.D. Va. 1984)
(listing 18 jurisdictions that have shown implied or express willingness to enforce
provisions contained in policy manuals). The total number of jurisdictions supporting enforcement of policy manual provisions has risen to 29 as a result of the
following decisions: Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 728 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying Pennsylvania law); Barger v. General Elec. Co., 599 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Va.
1984); Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170
(1984); Jackson v. Kinark Corp., 282 Ark. 548, 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984); Finley v.
Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 5 Conn. App. 394, 499 A.2d 64 (1985); Larrabee v.
Penobscott Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97 (Me. 1984); Staggs v. Blue Cross, 61
Md. App. 381, 486 A.2d 798 (1985); Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb.
677, 340 N.W.2d 388 (1983); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284,
491 A.2d 1257 (1985); Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154, 368 N.W.2d 666
(1985); Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985).
The following jurisdictions have been unwilling to enforce provisions contained in policy manuals: White v. ITT, 718 F.2d 994 (11 th Cir. 1983) (applying
Georgia law); White v. Chelsea Indus., 425 So. 2d 1090 (Ala. 1983); Heideck v.
Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982); Muller v. Stromberg Carlson
Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind.
App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975);Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52,
551 P.2d 779 (1976); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063
(1982); Walker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 77 N.C. App. 253, 335 S.E.2d 79
(1985); Williams v. Biscuitville, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 405, 253 S.E.2d 18 (1979);
Molder v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983).
99 See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 285-86, 491 A.2d at 1258.
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and the employer.'l° Chief Justice Wilentz, writing for a unanimous court, held that absent a prominent disclaimer, the terms
of a personnel manual could be considered a contractual offer to
a company's employees. 10' The court reached this conclusion by
first examining the circumstances
under which the Hoffmann-La
10 2
Roche manual was distributed.
The court noted that, in general, individual employees did
not execute formal contracts with Hoffmann-La Roche. 10 3 The
employees also were not unionized or under a collective bargaining agreement with the company. 10 4 Therefore, the court observed that the company policy manual provided the only
information regarding the employees' status. 10 5 The court stated
that it was probable that the employees regarded the manual as
setting forth the terms of their employment.'0 6 As a basis for its
reasoning, the court noted that the document was carefully organized and had "all of the appearances of corporate legitimacy." 10 7 ChiefJustice Wilentz further pointed out that when an
employee is notified of "company policy," he knows that policy
100 See id. at 297-304, 491 A.2d at 1264-68. Prior to its analysis, the court posed
two questions: "[Slhould the legal effect of the dissemination of a personnel policy
manual by a company with a substantial number of employees be determined solely
and strictly by traditional contract doctrine? Is that analysis adequate for the realities of such a workplace?" Id. at 289-90, 491 A.2d at 1260. Through its decision,
the court answered both questions in the affirmative.
1ol Id. at 285-86, 491 A.2d at 1258. The court held that unless there was a disclaimer "unmistakably" indicating that the provisions were nonbinding or there
was other similar evidence of the "employer's intent not to be bound," the provisions would be binding. Id. at 307, 491 A.2d at 1269-70.
102 See id. at 298-300, 491 A.2d at 1264-66.
103 Id. at 299, 491 A.2d at 1265; see supra note 7.
104 See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 296 & n.6, 491 A.2d at 1264 & n.6. The court noted that
"[t]he trial court viewed the manual as an attempt by Hoffmann-La Roche to avoid
a collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 296, 491 A.2d at 1264 (footnote
omitted).
105 See id. at 298-99, 491 A.2d at 1265.
106 See id. at 299, 491 A.2d at 1265.
107 Id. The court also reasoned that the title, "Personnel Policy Manual," dispelled
any doubt that the manual was a representation of Hoffmann-La Roche's official
"policy." Id.
Hoffmann-La Roche argued that the manual was nonbinding because it was
changed and amended periodically during the term of Woolley's employment. See
id. at 287 n.1, 299, 491 A.2d at 1258 n.l, 1265. The court rejected this argument.
See id. at 299-300, 491 A.2d at 1265-66. The supreme court reasoned that because
the changes almost always benefited the employees, which earned Hoffmann-La
Roche a favorable reputation in its labor relations, it was just as easy to conclude
that the company wanted to keep its benefits current, similar to its competitors who
were parties to collective bargaining agreements. See id. at 299, 491 A.2d at 1265.
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should be heeded.' 0 8
The court held that the employment manual was an offer of
employment terms; thus, the court turned to the issue of the employee's acceptance of those terms. 0 9 The court stated that the

employee accepted the offer by performing his job." 0 Chief Justice Wilentz noted that a unilateral contract analysis was the logi-

cal method of dealing with the facts before the court."1'

He

pointed out that most personnel policy manuals were produced,

distributed, and periodically amended voluntarily by the employer without employee negotiation. 1 2 Because the manual did
not seek a promise from any of the employees, the court noted
13
that continued work was the reasonable means of acceptance.'
Additionally, the court implied that under the unilateral contract
analysis, the employee's continued work without an obligation to
do so constituted the consideration to form a binding contract."14

The court also examined the underlying policy considerations of its holding." 15 The chief justice emphasized the importance ofjob security to the employee.1

6

He deemed this concept

108 Id.

109 See id. at 302, 491 A.2d at 1267.
110 See id. The court observed that acceptance is contingent upon what was bar-

gained for-either a return promise forming a bilateral contract, or a performance
forming a unilateral contract. Id.
S11 See id.; infra note 158.

See id.
113 See id. The court reasoned that once the manual was distributed, all employees, whether commencing work before or after its distribution, were subject to the
manual's terms. Id. at 305 n.10, 491 A.2d at 1268 n.10. Furthermore, the court
noted that even without specific knowledge or reliance on the terms of the manual,
an employee benefited from the manual's promises. Id. The court stated that the
employee's reliance was presumed. Id. at 304, 491 A.2d at 1268 (relying on
Anthony v.Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 51 N.J. Super. 139, 143 A.2d 762 (App.
Div. 1958).
114 See id. at 302, 491 A.2d at 1267. Although the court used a unilateral contract
analysis, it mentioned alternative contractual theories that might be used to enforce
the provisions of an employment manual. See id. at 303 n.9, 491 A.2d at 1267 n.9.
The court noted that such alternatives included the following: a third party beneficiary theory, in which all the employees would be the beneficiaries; the doctrine of
unconscionability, as annunciated in the Uniform Commercial Code; and the theory of promissory estoppel, as formulated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Id.
The court failed to state whether any of these alternative theories could have been
used successfully by Woolley. See id.
115 See id. at 297, 491 A.2d at 1264. The court stated that its holding was based
on "the common law of contracts interpreted in the light of sound policy applicable
to this modern setting." Id.
116 Id. at 297-98, 300, 491 A.2d at 1264, 1266. The employee's point of view was
perhaps best illustrated by the popular character Willie Loman in Arthur Miller's
Death of a Salesman. Subsequent to his employment discharge, Willie complained:
112
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"the single most important objective of the workforce." ' 1 7 The
court observed that other aspects of employment-pay, benefits,
working conditions, and hours-are mere contingencies to job
security."' Other policies the court sought to promote were "basic honesty" and fairness in employment relationships.' 9 The
supreme court opined that it would not permit an employer to
offer alluring benefits and inducements only to disavow them
summarily, regardless of the employer's good faith belief that the
provisions were unenforceable. 2 ° Noting that the average
worker was incapable of analyzing the policy manual in terms of
substantive legal validity, the court believed that it was reasonable for the workers to interpret the manual as giving them the
fundamental protection of job security.' 2 ' Utilizing the persuasive policy considerations of job security, fairness, and honesty
underlying its contractual analysis, 22 the supreme court recognized a new limitation to the employment-at-will rule.' 21 Mindful
of its departure from prior law, the court stated that "any application of the employee-at-will rule

. . .

must be tested by its le-

'2 4
gitimacy today and not by its acceptance yesterday."'

I put thirty-four years into this firm ....
You can't eat the orange and
throw the peel away-a man is not a piece of fruit!
W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 89, at vii-viii (quoting A. MILLER, DEATH OF A
SALESMAN,

act II, at 82 (1949)).

117 Woolley, 99 N.J. at 300, 491 A.2d at 1266. The court further noted that "the
reasons for giving such provisions binding force are particularly persuasive." Id.
118 Id. The court observed that without the fundamental protection ofjob security, "all other benefits are vulnerable." Id.
''9 Id. at 309, 491 A.2d at 1271.
120 Id. at 300, 491 A.2d at 1266. The court noted that when a policy manual,
"purporting to give job security, is distributed by the employer to a workforce,
substantial injustice may result if that promise is broken." Id. at 297, 491 A.2d at
1264.
121 See id. at 300-01, 491 A.2d at 1266.
122 See supra notes 115-121 and accompanying text. The court noted:
No longer is there the unquestioned deference to the interests of the
employer and the almost invariable dismissal of the contentions of the
employee ....
[T]his Court [is] no longer willing to decide these questions without examining the underlying interests involved, both the employer's and the employees', as well as the public interest, and the
extent to which our deference to one or the other serves or disserves the
needs of society as presently understood.
Woolley, 99 N.J. at 291, 491 A.2d at 1261.
123 See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 285-86, 491 A.2d at 1258.
124 Id. at 292, 491 A.2d at 1262 (citation omitted).
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UNILATERAL CONTRACT ANALYSIS: ENFORCING AN
AGREEMENT BASED ON PERFORMANCE

The employment-at-will rule has been explained as a rule of
construction rather than a rule of substantive law.' 25 In other
words, courts have allowed either contracting party to prove that
an employment relationship other than "at will" was intended,
despite the at-will presumption.' 26 Judicial interpretations of
terms or promises in company policy manuals, however, have
27
been inconsistent; some courts have used estoppel theories,
others have used pure contractual doctrine, 128 29and still others
have found the promises wholly unenforceable.'
The unilateral contract analysis provides the most logical
means for the enforcement of provisions in policy manuals. It
realistically explains the employment relationship when the employer sets the terms of employment because the relationship is
inherently based on performance rather than on promises.
Although the classification of some contracts as 3unilateral has
been criticized,' 30 it continues to gain popularity.' '
One contemporary writer has observed that "the most notable expansion of unilateral contract analysis has occurred in disputes between employers and employees.' 32 For example,
125 See, e.g., Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 546, 688
P.2d 170, 172 (1984); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628
(Minn. 1983).
126 See, e.g., Batchelor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 574 F. Supp. 1480, 1485 (E.D.
Mich. 1983); Eilen v. Tappin's, Inc., 16 N.J. Super. 53, 56, 83 A.2d 817, 818 (Law
Div. 1951); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 comment a (1958)

("circumstances surrounding the employment may . . . indicate that the parties
have contracted with reference to a period of time").
127 See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
(1980). The Toussaint court discussed the case in terms of the estoppel elements of
reliance and reasonable expectations rather than in terms of contractual elements.
See id. at 598-99, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
128 See, e.g., Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 548, 688
P.2d 170, 174 (1984); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626
(Minn. 1983); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 228-31, 685
P.2d 1081, 1087-88 (1984).
129 See supra note 98 (listing cases holding policy manuals unenforceable).
130 See generally Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance (pts. 1 &
2), 48 YALE L.J. 1 , 779 (1938-1939); Stoljar, The FalseDistinction Between Bilateraland
Unilateral Contracts, 64 YALE L.J. 515 (1955) (both criticizing use of unilateral contract analysis).
131 See Pettit, Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U.L. REV. 551, 559 (1983).
132 Id. Use of the unilateral contract in employment relations, however, is not a
new development. See, e.g.,
Henderson Land & Lumber Co. v. Barber, 17 Ala. App.
337, 85 So. 35 (1920); Orton & Steinbrenner Co. v. Miltonberger, 74 Ind. App.
462, 129 N.E. 47 (1920); Roberts v. Mays Mills, Inc., 184 N.C. 406, 114 S.E. 530
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courts have previously used the unilateral contract as the frame33 severence pay, 3 4 bonus, 35
work for analyzing pension benefit,
and profit-sharing cases.' 3 6 Courts have failed, however, to utilize
fully the unilateral contract analysis when resolving policy manual cases.' 3 7 These courts have often ignored the concepts of offer and acceptance and have focused solely on the issues relating
to consideration. 3 8 Because all three of these elements are part
of traditional contract doctrine, however, courts should analyze
each one when considering alleged breaches of promises con139
tained in employers' policy manuals.

A.

Offer

An offer has been defined as "an expression by one party of
his assent to certain definite terms."' 4 The offeror's intent to
(1922); Scott v.J.F. Duthie & Co., 125 Wash. 470, 216 P. 853 (1923) (all applying
unilateral contract principles in context of employee bonuses).
133 See, e.g., Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1975); Marvel v. Dannemann, 490 F. Supp. 170 (D. Del. 1980); Amicone v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 19
Utah 2d 297, 431 P.2d 130 (1967); Jacoby v. Grays Harbor Chair & Mfg. Co., 77
Wash. 2d 911, 468 P.2d 666 (1970).
134 See, e.g., Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct.App. 1976); Hercules
Powder Co. v. Brookfield, 189 Va. 531, 53 S.E.2d 804 (1949).
135 See, e.g., Sigrist v. Century 21 Corp., 519 P.2d 362 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973);
Gustafson v. Lindquist, 40 Ill. App. 3d 152, 351 N.E.2d 280 (1976); Toch v. Eric
Schuster Corp., 490 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
136 See, e.g., Russell v. Princeton Laboratories, Inc., 50 N.J. 30, 231 A.2d 800
(1967); Evo v.Jomac, Inc., 119 N.J. Super. 7, 289 A.2d 551 (Law Div. 1972); Garner
v. Girard Trust Bank, 442 Pa. 166, 275 A.2d 359 (1971).
137 See infra note 138.
138 See, e.g., Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, 574 F. Supp. 805 (D. Colo. 1983);
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981);
Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 668 P.2d 261 (1983); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
'39 See generally Tobias v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 362 N.W.2d 380, 381 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985). The Tobias court stated: "[A] handbook or manual may become
part of the employment contract if the requirements for formation of a unilateral
contract are met. Those requirements are: an offer, communicated to the offeree,
an acceptance by the offeree, and consideration." Id. (citations omitted). Other
courts have utilized the unilateral contract analysis to enforce policy manual provisions. See, e.g., Thompson v. American Motor Inns, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 409 (W.D.
Va. 1985); Finley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 5 Conn. App. 394, 499 A.2d 64
(1985); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Langdon
v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
140 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 11, at 23 (3d ed. 1961). The Supreme
Court of Minnesota emphasized the importance of the definiteness of the offer; it
stated: "The offer must be definite in form .... [Gleneral statements of policy
are no more than that and do not meet the contractual requirements for an offer."
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn. 1983).
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contract is normally examined from the offeree's point of view.' 4
Specifically, an objective standard is used, in which a determination is made of what a reasonable person in the position and circumstances of the offeree would consider the offeror's
manifestations to mean. 142 To determine the effect of a manual
on a "reasonable" employee, courts must consider the specificity
of the document, the surrounding circumstances, and any other
factors evidencing the employer's intent. 4 1 Considering the nature of the employment relationship, it is reasonable that a person who accepts a job would believe that he is bound to follow
company policy. The employee would similarly expect the employer to follow its own policy. If the policy is articulated in a
manual, it further emphasizes the importance of the provisions
within. 144 Therefore, in many cases, an employee is justified in
believing that promises contained in 45
policy manuals are part of
the employer's offer of employment.
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated in Woolley that a policy manual containing a prominent disclaimer would not constitute a binding employment contract. 1 46 A disclaimer clearly
demonstrates the employer's intent concerning the effect of the
manual. 147 The disclaimer exception is therefore consistent with
the "offer" analysis; a clear disclaimer renders an employee's expectation of a manual's guarantees unreasonable. 4 8 A clear and
141 See generally E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 36, at 114 (1982) ("[I]t is enough
that the [offeree] had reason to believe that the [offeror] had that intention [to
contract].").
142 J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 24 (2d ed. 1977). This has
been called the "objective test." Id. at 25.
143 See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 141, § 3.10, at 125. The author stated:
[E]ach [case] turns on its own special facts. A court will look first to the
language of the particular proposal. It will then take account of any
prior communications between the parties. It will also consider such
circumstances as the completeness of the suggested bargain and the
number of persons to whom the proposal is addressed.
Id.; see also Dennis v. Thermoid Co., 128 N.J.L. 303, 303, 25 A.2d 886, 886 (1942)
("the intention of the parties must be found as a fact from all the circumstances
surrounding the employment").
144 See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 299, 491 A.2d at 1265.
145 Otherwise, if employees' "legitimate expectations" flowing from policy manuals are not enforced, then the manuals could be considered as "full of sound and
fury ... Signifying nothing." See W. SHAKESPEARE, Macbeth, act V, scene V, in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE 1069 (H. Craig & D. Bevington eds., rev. ed.
1973).
146 See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 307, 491 A.2d at 1269-70.
147 See id.; DeGiuseppe, supra note 33, at 53.
148 See, e.g., Batchelor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 574 F. Supp. 1480 (E.D. Mich.

1983). In Batchelor, the plaintiff claimed that a personnel booklet modified the em-
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prominent disclaimer evincing an employer's intent not to be
bound renders a policy manual incapable of being an offer that
can be accepted.1 49 The clarity of the language in the disclaimer
is of crucial significance to the employer because of the presumption that ambiguities in provisions will be resolved against the
party drafting the offer.' 5 °
B. Acceptance
Acceptance of an offer has been defined as "a manifestation
of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a manner
invited or required by the offer."'"' Because courts have found
that policy manuals can be offers to contract, the issue arises as to
how the employee's assent is to be manifested in order for the
employer's promises to become enforceable. Acceptance is typically communicated by one of two forms: a bargained-for return
promise or a bargained-for action or inaction. 152 Modern contract doctrine suggests that where an offer ambiguously states the
mode of acceptance, the offeree may express his intent to accept
by any means reasonable under the circumstances. 153
Contracts are generally categorized as bilateral or unilateral. 154 An acceptance by a promise forms a bilateral contract. 55
In contrast, a unilateral contract is formed when an offer is acployer's right to terminate employees at will. Id. at 1486. The court, however,
found that her employment application, which contained a disclaimer ofjob security, became a part of her employment contract. See id. at 1484. The disclaimer
read: "[M]y employment and compensation can be terminated, with or without cause, and with
or without notice, at any time, at the option of either the Company or myself." Id. at 1483; see
also Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344, 346 (E.D. Mich. 1980)
(disclaimer deprived plaintiff of any legitimate expectation of just-cause termination). But see Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154, 164, 368 N.W.2d 666, 671
(1985) (holding procedures in company policy manuals may become part of employment contract despite disclaimer in employment application).
149 Although an express disclaimer may evidence an employer's intent, an oral
assurance to the contrary may override a disclaimer. See Schipani v. Ford Motor
Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 614, 302 N.W.2d 307, 311 (1981). In Schipani, the court
stated that "under appropriate circumstances, oral promises may negate the effect
of disclaimers which are intended to absolve employers from liability for policies
presented in handbooks or other employer literature." Id.
150 See, e.g., In re Miller, 90 N.J. 210, 221, 447 A.2d 549, 555 (1982) ("Where an
ambiguity appears in a written agreement, the writing is to be strictly construed
against the draftsman.").
151 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50(1) (1981).
152 See id. § 50 comment a.
153 See, e.g.,
id. § 30(2). See generally Note, Acceptance of Unclear Offers, 60 YALE L.J.
1043 (1951).
154 See 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 13, at 23.
155 See id.
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cepted by a performance.1 56 Although some authorities have repudiated the distinction between the bilateral contract and the
unilateral contract, 157 the latter is clearly useful in employment
manual cases. 158 In circumstances similar to Woolley, the unilateral contract analysis enables courts to use contract principles for
determining the existence of an enforceable promise without
straining to find a return promise.' 59 In a unilateral contract, only
the offeror makes a promise. So long as the promise remains in
effect, the offeror has a duty to uphold it, while the offeree gains
a right to the benefit of that promise. 16 Accordingly, in policy
manual cases, the employer has a duty to abide by its policy manual, while the employee has a right to the promises the manual
confers.
For an offer to be accepted, it must be communicated to the
offeree. 16 1 As a general rule, an acceptance can only be validly
consummated with knowledge of the offer. 162 In addition, courts
examining unilateral contract relationships often require proof of
reliance on the offer before a performance will act as an acceptance. 163 In policy manual cases, however, courts generally do not
156 See id. In discussing the employer-promised "bonus" case, one commentator
notes that
the offered promise is almost always so made as to make it unnecessary
for the employee to give any notice of his assent. It is sufficient that he
continues in the employment as requested. It is certain that after so
continuing in performance, the employer cannot withdraw or repudiate
his promise without liability . . . . A unilateralcontract exists.
1 A. CORBIN, supra note 140, § 70, at 294 (emphasis added).
157 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
158 See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 302, 491 A.2d at 1267. The Woolley court stated:
The unilateral contract analysis is perfectly adequate for that employee
who was aware of the manual and who continued to work intending that
continuation to be the action in exchange for the employer's promise; it
is even more helpful in support of that conclusion if, but for the employer's policy manual, the employee would have quit.
Id. (citation omitted).
159 See Pettit, supra note 131, at 591.
160 See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 141, at 109-10.
161 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 33, at 92. A policy manual directed and distributed to all employees is a sufficient "communication." See, e.g., Pine River State
Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 630 (Minn. 1983). When a manual is not distributed, however, the offer is not communicated and thus cannot be accepted. E.g.,
Tobias v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 362 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985);
cf. Hinkeldey v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Mo. 1971) (although
policy manual was undistributed, it could still be communicated to employee).
162 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 140, § 59; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 53 (1932).
163 See, e.g., Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891). In Hamer, the
plaintiff was promised $5000 "if he . . .refrain[ed] from drinking, using tobacco,
swearing and playing cards or billiards for money until he became twenty-one years
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inquire into the knowledge and reliance of the employee. 1"
Nevertheless, proving these elements could become a significant
165
obstacle for the employee claiming a wrongful termination.
An exception exists, however, to the "knowledge" and
"proof of reliance" rules. It arises when an offeror contracts with
a class of offerees. 166 Where an offer is generally communicated
to a class, reliance on the offer may be presumed.167 While this idea
is applied in collective bargaining agreements, 168 it can be analogously applied to employment manual cases. As the court in
Woolley stated, "[i]f reliance is not presumed, a strict contractual
analysis might protect the rights of some employees and not
others." 169 Thus, when an employer chooses to offer promises in
the form of a policy manual that logically serve its own interests 170 to a class of beneficiaries (its employees), the members of
that class should be allowed the full benefit of the promises inof age." Id. at 540, 27 N.E. at 256. The court ruled that because the plaintiffs
reliance on the promise led to his performance, there was an enforceable contract.
See id. at 546, 27 N.E. at 257.
164 See Pettit, supra note 131, at 580.
165 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Eastman Kodak Co., 65 N.Y.2d 724, 481 N.E.2d 549,
492 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1985) (reliance upon specific representation needed); Patrowich v.
Chemical Bank, 98 A.D.2d 318, 470 N.Y.S.2d 599, affdon othergroundsper curiam, 63
N.Y.2d 541, 473 N.E.2d 11,483 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1984).
166 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981) (standardized contracts should be "interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the terms of
the writing"). The employment contract based on a distributed policy manual can
be considered a standardized agreement-in essence, it is a nonunion "collective
bargaining agreement." See Pettit, supra note 131, at 583. Such an agreement involving a group of employees, therefore, should not require a showing of reliance.
See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 613 & n.25, 292
N.W.2d 880, 892 & n.25 (1980); Anthony v.Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 51 N.J.
Super. 139, 145-46, 143 A.2d 762, 765 (App. Div. 1958).
167 See, e.g., Anthony v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 51 N.J. Super. 139, 143
A.2d 762 (App. Div. 1958). The Anthony court stated that when at-will employees
are extended promises by the employer, "reliance is presumed, just as it always is
presumed that everything an employer agrees to pay or give in return for service by
an employee was relied upon by the latter in going to work after being apprised as
to the terms of compensation." Id. at 145-46, 143 A.2d at 765. Furthermore, a
purpose of tailoring standardized employment contracts, see supra note 157, to a
group of employees "is to eliminate bargaining over details of individual transactions." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 comment b (1981). If knowledge or reliance is not presumed, "that purpose would not be served if a
substantial number of [employees] retained counsel and reviewed the standard
terms." See id.
168 See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 304 n.10, 491 A.2d at 1268 n.10.
169 Id.
170 See generally Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892 (noting that employment policies and practices are designed to "[secure] an orderly, cooperative
and loyal work force").
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tended. Courts should follow this principle notwithstanding any
evidentiary impediment such as knowledge or reliance on the
part of the employees.
C. Consideration
Consideration has been explained as a "legal detriment that
has been bargained for and exchanged for the promise."17' Basic
contract doctrine requires that consideration, in the form of an
act or forbearance, must be rendered in exchange for the employer's offer in order to create an enforceable unilateral contract. 72 The requirement of consideration has been crucial in
most courts' analyses regarding the contractual effect of employment manuals.' 73 These courts generally focus on two issues:
whether an additional or independent consideration is necessary
and whether "mutuality of obligation" is needed.
One common issue courts must determine regarding consideration in an employment case is whether consideration additional and independent to an employee's continued service is
necessary to make a promise communicated by a policy manual
enforceable. Courts that have found policy manuals to be contractually enforceable have held that continued performance satisfies the requirement of consideration. 1 74 These courts are
essentially correct.
In discussing the issue of independent consideration, a fundamental distinction must be made concerning the application of
the doctrine of consideration. In contracts of "permanent" or
"lifetime" employment, courts may rightfully require a clear
showing of the employer's intent to be bound; hence, additional
consideration may be necessary.1 75 The requirement of additional consideration, however, has been described as serving only
an evidentiary function. 1 76 Thus, being more a rule of construc171 J. CALAMARI
172

&J.

PERILLO,

supra note 142, at 134-35 (footnotes omitted).

See id. at 134.

See, e.g., cases accompanying infra notes 174 & 183.
See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 325-27, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917, 925 (1981); Salimi v. Farmers Ins. Group, 684 P.2d 264, 265 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1984); Pine River State Bank v. Mettile, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983).
175 See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 294-95, 491 A.2d at 1262-63.
176 See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
925; see also Eilen v. Tappin's Inc., 16 N.J. Super. 53, 56, 83 A.2d 817, 818 (Law Div.
1951) (the requirement of additional consideration "is merely a device created by
the courts to test whether or not the parties specifically and definitely intended to
make such a contract").
173

174
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tion than of substance,' 77 it clearly should not be applied rigidly
to all employment contract cases.
The basic employment-at-will contract consists of the payment of wages for the employee's services and does not require
independent consideration. Additional employer offerings such
as increased job security, fringe benefits, and bonuses are extensions of the basic employment contract and similarly should not
require independent consideration.' 7 8 An employer supplements
contracts of indefinite duration with benefits and inducements in
order to generate a more productive work force.179 If additional
consideration were required, many claims by employees for these
inducements would be unfairly voided, while still allowing an employer to take advantage of the employee's increased production.
The other issue addressed by courts examining the policy
manual's effect on the employment relation has been whether
"mutuality of obligation" is necessary. The doctrine of mutuality
of obligation holds that both parties must be bound by the contract; if not, neither party is bound.18 0 Inherent in the concept of
the unilateral contract as applied to the employment relationship, however, is that only one party gives a binding promise,
while the other renders a performance to make the contract enforceable.18 ' Historically, lack of mutuality was misapplied by
courts to strike down claims arising out of employment contracts. 8 2 Modern courts, though, have held that consideration
rather than mutuality of obligation is required. 8 3 As Corbin
177 Pine River State Bank v. Mettile, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983).
178 See W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 89, at 45.
179 See id. at 46. The authors state:

An express or implied promise ofjob security. . . is often an ingredient
in the complex of benefits and salary that make up the environment of
an efficient work place. .

.

. [I]t is reasonable to surmise that the em-

ployer at least believes that the encouragement of continuing employment and policies ofjob security and fairness have a favorable impact on
productivity.
Id.
180 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 140, § 152, at 2.
181 See id. at 13-14.
182 W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 89, at 52-53.
183 E.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettile, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983);
Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 12, 472 N.E.2d 765, 776 (1984). The
Helle court stated that
[a]s a contract defense, the mutuality doctrine has become a faltering
rampart to which a litigant retreats at his own peril. Under contemporary analysis of unilateral contracts, the "mutuality" doctrine crumbles
of its own weight. .

.

. Thus understood, a unilateral contract lacks

"mutuality" only when there is a failure of consideration.
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noted of the employment situation,
the employee has made no return promise and has retained
the power and legal privilege of terminating the employment
"at will". The employer's promise is supported by the service
that has been begun or rendered or by the other executed
consideration or action in reliance. There is a valid unilateral
contract; there is84 an obligation although there is no "mutality
of obligation."'
Therefore, under a unilateral contract analysis, courts should find
valid contractual obligations arising from employment manuals,
although "mutuality of obligation" may appear to be lacking.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Woolley decision is indicative of a steady judicial departure from strict adherence to the employment-at-will rule. The
rule has been increasingly abrogated by courts under circumstances where its blind acceptance could not be justified in modern society. Many decisions similar to Woolley accentuate
underlying policy arguments so as to overshadow effectively a
strong contractual argument. Applying a unilateral contract
analysis, however, is the appropriate means for examining
promises communicated within a company policy manual.
Although Woolley answered many questions regarding the
status of the employment-at-will rule in New Jersey, the acceptance of a contract limitation to the rule creates many new issues
to be resolved. For example, the court declined to decide when
1 85
and how a policy manual could be changed by an employer.
While it appears a manual can be altered freely, there may be
some limitation on amendments to job security provisions. 8 6 Another unanswered question is whether the decision will have a
retroactive effect. In light of New Jersey precedent, it is possible
that Woolley will be given at least partial retroactive application,
Id. (citations omitted).
184 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 140, § 152, at 14 (footnote omitted).
185 See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 309, 491 A.2d at 1270-71. The court in Woolley posited
that, in general, changes to policy manuals would be permitted. See id. The court
stated: "We express no opinion, however, on whether or to what extent [changes]
are permitted when they adversely affect a binding job security provision." Id., 491
A.2d at 1271.
186 See, e.g., Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 527-28 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976)
("employer remains free to modify such policies prospectively" so long as there is
no interference with accrued contractual rights); cf. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 615, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980) (policy manual "can be
unilaterally amended by the employer without notice to the employee").
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weighing all interests involved. 87
The Woolley decision will have a tremendous impact on the
employer-employee relationship. The court indicated that the
decision should not cause the employer to become "reluctant" in
distributing policy manuals. It is probable, however, that many
employers will be overly cautious and will distribute manuals devoid of job security language. Furthermore, employers may begin to include disclaimers in employment manuals or to avoid
issuing manuals at all for fear of suit. Employers that seek the
highest quality in their work force, however, may be compelled to
guarantee job security to nonunion workers through communications such as company policy manuals. Although the more immediate effect of Woolley will be a wave of wrongful discharge
litigation, the court will achieve what it sought to accomplish:
greater fairness and equity in the employment relationship.
Michael A. Chagares
187 See generally Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., 96 N.J. 419, 476 A.2d 763
(1984) (discussing history of applying decisions retroactively in New Jersey), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 808 (1985).

